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Sources — Suspec's evidence bibliography

sourceSource: suspec/docs/research/sources.mdModified: 2026-07-18

This is the single bibliography Suspec's inline [[KEY]] citations resolve to. Research is referenced contextually — each [[KEY]] sits in the doc whose claim it grounds (the happy-path pages, reference pages, examples, and ADRs) and links to its entry here; there is no separate "research layer" of standalone essays, only this ledger. It is held to one discipline ("real science, not astrology" — principles, Claims need sources): every load-bearing empirical claim cites a verified entry below, with the recorded caveats. Entries marked caveated (non-peer-reviewed) MUST NOT carry a MUST-level claim. Entries in Rejected MUST NOT be cited — they are recorded so a fabricated citation is never silently re-introduced.

Entries are retained even while uncited: the ledger records what was verified and what was rejected so future claims can bind to it without re-verification. An uncited entry is inventory, not error. This bibliography was assembled after web verification in June 2026. Several headline figures circulating in the skill-authoring literature rested on fabricated or misattributed arXiv ids and were rejected below.


Verified — primary research (peer-reviewed, finding confirmed)

[TREEOFTHOUGHTS] Tree of Thoughts: Deliberate Problem Solving with Large Language Models. Yao, Yu, Zhao, Shafran, Griffiths, Cao, Narasimhan. NeurIPS 2023, arXiv:2305.10601 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). On Game of 24, GPT-4 with chain-of-thought solved 4% of tasks; Tree-of-Thoughts reached 74%. Grounds: deliberate planning and search over flat generation.

[REFLEXION] Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learning. Shinn, Cassano, Berman, Gopinath, Narasimhan, Yao. NeurIPS 2023, arXiv:2303.11366 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch — abstract states the figure verbatim). Verbal self-reflection between trials yields 91% pass@1 on HumanEval vs the 80% GPT-4 baseline. Grounds: recording decisive evidence makes an implicit signal checkable.

[SCRATCHPAD] Show Your Work: Scratchpads for Intermediate Computation with Language Models. Nye, Andreassen, Gur-Ari, Michalewski, Austin, Bieber, Dohan, Lewkowycz, Bosma, Luan, Sutton, Odena. ICLR 2022 Workshop (DL4C), arXiv:2112.00114 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026; venue is a workshop poster, not a main-conference acceptance — audit O-1). Emitting intermediate steps to a "scratchpad" dramatically improves multi-step computation (long addition → program execution). Grounds: externalising intermediate work when it changes execution or reviewability.

[PLANSOLVE] Plan-and-Solve Prompting: Improving Zero-Shot Chain-of-Thought Reasoning. Wang, Xu, Lan, Hu, Lan, Lee, Lim. ACL 2023, arXiv:2305.04091 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). Devise a plan that divides the task into subtasks, then execute it; consistently outperforms zero-shot CoT across arithmetic/commonsense/symbolic reasoning. Grounds: plan before execution when the work needs decomposition.

[FORMATFREE] Let Me Speak Freely? A Study on the Impact of Format Restrictions on Performance of Large Language Models. Tam, Wu, Tsai, Lin, Lee, Chen. EMNLP 2024 (Industry Track), arXiv:2408.02442 (opens in new tab) (ACL Anthology 2024.emnlp-industry.91). Verified (June 2026, ACL Anthology + abstract fetch). Format restriction degrades reasoning — JSON-mode is worst on reasoning tasks such as GSM8K, looser prompts score higher, and the effect intensifies with stricter constraints — while the same structure helps classification/extraction; parsing-error rates are ~0%, so the loss is reasoning-order compression, not malformed output. Grounds: structure the frame, not the reasoning; the evidence-before-conclusion ordering rule; reason free-form, then emit the structured artifact.

[SELFCORRECT] When Can LLMs Actually Correct Their Own Mistakes? A Critical Survey of Self-Correction of LLMs. Kamoi, Zhang, Zhang, Han, Zhang. TACL 2024, arXiv:2406.01297 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). No prior work shows reliable self-correction from prompted self-feedback; self-correction succeeds only where a reliable external signal is available (or after large-scale fine-tuning). Grounds: the reliability lever is an external deterministic check, not the model judging itself.

[ATTRFIRST] Attribute First, then Generate: Locally-attributable Grounded Text Generation. Slobodkin, Hirsch, Cattan, Schuster, Dagan. ACL 2024, arXiv:2403.17104 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). Selecting source evidence before generating (content-selection → planning → generation) yields locally-attributable text with more concise, verifiable citations at equal quality. Grounds: the evidence-first ordering rule and provenance-as-binding (cite the supporting span, then state the claim).

[TRUSTALIGN] Measuring and Enhancing Trustworthiness of LLMs in RAG through Grounded Attributions and Learning to Refuse. Song, Sim, Bhardwaj, Chieu, Majumder, Poria. ICLR 2025 (Oral), arXiv:2409.11242 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). An alignment method (Trust-Align) that rewards grounded attribution and refusing when unsupported materially raises measured trustworthiness across model families; plain prompting / in-context learning does not. Grounds: provenance-or-refuse — an unsupported claim should be withheld, not emitted.

[CORRELATED] Correlated Errors in Large Language Models. Kim, Garg, Peng, Garg. ICML 2025, arXiv:2506.07962 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). Across 350+ models, models agree ~60% of the time when both are wrong, and error-correlation persists across distinct architectures and providers and grows with capability — an "algorithmic monoculture" that undermines majority voting, ensembling, and LLM-as-judge. Grounds: do not treat agreement / voting / same-family self-critique as a correctness signal.

[MINJA] Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction (MINJA). Dong, Xu, He, Li, Tang, Liu, Liu, Xiang. NeurIPS 2025, arXiv:2503.03704 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, OpenReview + search). A query-only attacker injects malicious records into an agent's memory (~98% injection success; ~70–77% downstream attack success) that later fire on benign queries. Grounds threat-motivated design, not a measured reliability gain: a native memory needs evidence, applicability boundaries, and correction so an injected record cannot masquerade as authoritative. The attack is measured; Suspec's defense against it is design, not a measured delta.

[SWEBENCH-ADQ] Are "Solved Issues" in SWE-bench Really Solved Correctly? An Empirical Study. Wang, Pradel, Liu. ICSE 2026, arXiv:2503.15223 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, venue + finding; figures per audit O-0). Differential patch testing (PatchDiff) finds 7.8% of "passing" patches fail the developer suite, inflating reported resolution rates by ~6.2 absolute points (a "~14.5 pt" figure is fabricated — do not cite). Grounds: oracle adequacy — passing the bundled suite overstates correctness; require a stronger/independent oracle (the verify rationale).

[UTBOOST] UTBoost: Rigorous Evaluation of Coding Agents on SWE-Bench. Yu, Zhu, He, Kang. ACL 2025 (Anthology 2025.acl-long.189), arXiv:2506.09289 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, ACL Anthology + finding). Generated tests uncovered 345 erroneous patches wrongly labeled passed, impacting 40.9% of SWE-Bench Lite and 24.4% of SWE-Bench Verified leaderboard entries. Grounds (with [SWEBENCH-ADQ]): independent corroboration of SWE-bench oracle inadequacy.

[SELFPREFER] LLM Evaluators Recognize and Favor Their Own Generations. Panickssery, Bowman, Feng. NeurIPS 2024, arXiv:2404.13076 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, venue + finding). An LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than human annotators judge they merit (self-preference), and the bias rises linearly with the model's self-recognition — its ability to tell its own text apart. Grounds: the implementer-≠-reviewer rule — an author MUST NOT render the manual judgment on its own output.

[JUDGEBIAS] Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena. Zheng, Chiang, Sheng, Zhuang, Wu, Zhuang, Lin, Li, Li, Xing, Gonzalez, Stoica. NeurIPS 2023 (Datasets & Benchmarks), arXiv:2306.05685 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, venue + finding). Documents the structural biases of an LLM judge: self-enhancement (rates its own outputs more favourably), position (favours the first/last answer), and verbosity (favours longer answers). Grounds: judge bias is directional and predictable, so a manual verdict needs a recorded, independent, non-author judge.

[CLARIFYGPT] ClarifyGPT: A Framework for Enhancing LLM-Based Code Generation via Requirements Clarification. Mu et al. FSE 2024 (Proc. ACM Softw. Eng., DOI 10.1145/3660810 (opens in new tab)), arXiv:2310.10996 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch + adversarial re-verification, 4/4 votes). Detecting requirement ambiguity (code-consistency check), asking targeted clarifying questions, then regenerating raises GPT-4 Pass@1 70.96%→80.80% on MBPP-sanitized (human eval, n=10) and 68.02%→75.75% average across four benchmarks (simulated users; simulation has ground-truth access — treat gains as an upper bound). Grounds: disambiguated requirement text measurably improves first-pass correctness — the mechanism a short curated spec front-loads.

[SPECFIX] Automated Repair of Ambiguous Problem Descriptions for LLM-Based Code Generation. Jia, Morris, Ye, Sarro, Mechtaev. ASE 2025, arXiv:2505.07270 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch + adversarial re-verification, 4/4 votes). Repairing only the requirement TEXT (no interaction) modified 43.58% of benchmark descriptions and improved Pass@1 on the modified subset by 30.9% (+4.09% absolute benchmark-wide); repaired descriptions transfer across models (+10.48%). Grounds: clarified requirement text is model-agnostic and can improve correctness. Scope caveat: function-level benchmarks, not repo-level workflows.

[HUMANEVALCOMM] HumanEvalComm: Benchmarking the Communication Competence of Code Generation for LLMs and LLM Agents. Wu, Fard. ACM TOSEM 2025, arXiv:2406.00215 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch + adversarial re-verification, 2/2 votes; Table-4 figures confirmed). Injecting ambiguity/incompleteness into HumanEval drops Pass@1 35–52% (ChatGPT 65.58%→33.77% ambiguity, →27.95% incompleteness); >60% of model responses code anyway instead of asking. Boundary finding: a clarification-forcing agent on ALREADY-CLEAR tasks scored 27.45% vs 65.58% — indiscriminate process on clear tasks measurably hurts. Grounds: requirement clarity is load-bearing; indiscriminate clarification-forcing on clear tasks measurably hurts — the extension to documents/process generally is design rationale, not a measured result.

[CATALDI-AI-REVIEW] Perceptions and challenges of AI-driven code reviews: A qualitative exploration of developer experiences. Cataldi. Issues in Information Systems 26(2):346–360, 2025, DOI 10.48009/2_iis_127 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). Semi-structured interviews with 10 developers, technical leads, and architects; thematic analysis found trust, reliability, and lack of context understanding as dominant concerns, with participants advocating for transparent, context-aware AI tools that augment rather than replace human reviewers. Grounds: the need for structured human oversight and explainable review artifacts in AI-assisted workflows.

[OVERTRUST-CFF] To Trust or to Think: Cognitive Forcing Functions Can Reduce Overreliance on AI in AI-assisted Decision-making. Buçinca, Malaya, Gajos. Proc. ACM Human-Computer Interaction 5, CSCW1 (2021) (DOI 10.1145/3449287 (opens in new tab)), arXiv:2102.09692 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web search — Harvard/EECS listings + abstract). In AI-assisted decision-making, cognitive forcing functions — lightweight interventions that interrupt automatic acceptance at the moment of decision (ask the human to decide before seeing the AI's answer; add a brief wait; make the human request the recommendation) — reduced over-reliance on incorrect AI advice more than explanations did; simply adding explanations did not reliably help. Grounds: a handoff that routes a decision should add a light forcing function (what it blocks; decide-before-accepting), not just more justification prose — explanation alone does not cure over-trust.

[CHOICEOVERLOAD] Choice overload is conditional, not a law of option count. Two peer-reviewed meta-analyses: Scheibehenne, Greifeneder & Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload, Journal of Consumer Research 37(3):409–425, 2010 (63 conditions, N≈5,036) — the mean effect of assortment size on choice overload is virtually zero with large between-study variance, no sufficient conditions identified; and Chernev, Böckenholt & Goodman, Choice Overload: A Conceptual Review and Meta-Analysis, Journal of Consumer Psychology 25(2):333–358, 2015 (99 observations) — overload emerges only under four moderators: choice-set complexity, decision-task difficulty, preference uncertainty, decision goal. Verified (June 2026, web search — JCR/JCP listings + author PDFs). Grounds: the number of options is not the lever — a hard count cap is unsupported; what drives overload is decision difficulty, so the fix is comparable, well-structured options, not a tally (2–4 is a soft heuristic, never a measured optimum).

[ALGOAVERSION] Algorithm Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After Seeing Them Err. Dietvorst, Simmons, Massey. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144(1):114–126, 2015. Verified (June 2026, web search). After seeing an algorithm make a mistake, people lose confidence in it and revert to (worse) human judgment faster than they would after an equivalent human error — even when the algorithm still outperforms. Grounds: the second failure mode a decision handoff must guard against — once an agent errs once, the human over-discounts it; so a handoff pairs the recommendation with the case for and against, letting the human re-engage rather than reflexively reject.

[AICODE-INSECURE] Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants? Perry, Srivastava, Kumar, Boneh. ACM CCS 2023 (DOI 10.1145/3576915.3623157 (opens in new tab)), arXiv:2211.03622 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web search — ACM DL + author repository). In a controlled user study, participants with access to an AI coding assistant wrote less secure code on most tasks yet rated their insecure answers as more secure than the control group. Grounds: the over-trust failure mode is documented in the developer domain specifically — confidence rises while quality falls — so a decision handoff to a developer is not a foreign transplant from clinical/lay-user studies; the mechanism appears at the keyboard.

[RELYORNOT] To Rely or Not to Rely? Evaluating Interventions for Appropriate Reliance on Large Language Models. Bo, Wan, Anderson. Proc. 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (DOI 10.1145/3706598.3714097 (opens in new tab)), arXiv:2412.15584 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web search — arXiv + researchr bibtex for authorship). Across the studied interventions, the aids reduced over-reliance but generally did not improve appropriate reliance, and people were more confident when over- or under-relying than when calibrated. Grounds: the honest ceiling on the decision-handoff convention — structured decision support reduces blind acceptance but is not a proven cure for miscalibrated trust; adopt it as a reasoned convention, not an established win.

[ZHENG-PERSONA] When "A Helpful Assistant" Is Not Really Helpful: Personas in System Prompts Do Not Improve Performances. Zheng, Pei, Jurgens, et al. EMNLP 2024 (Findings), arXiv:2311.10054 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, deep-research direct fetch + 3-vote). Across 162 roles, 4 LLM families, and 2,410 factual questions, adding a persona to the system prompt did not systematically improve accuracy over a no-persona control, and the per-persona effect is essentially random. Grounds: role identity is not a reliable accuracy lever; concrete directives matter.

[KONG-ROLEPLAY] Better Zero-Shot Reasoning with Role-Play Prompting. Kong, Zhang, Wang, et al. NAACL 2024, arXiv:2308.07702 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, deep-research direct fetch + 3-vote). Role-play prompting beat standard zero-shot across most of twelve reasoning benchmarks (e.g. Last-Letter 23.8%→84.2%, AQuA 53.5%→63.8%); the authors frame the gain as an implicit chain-of-thought trigger. Grounds: role framing helps via the task-relevant procedure it evokes — which can live in the work guide — not via the identity (ADR-0093).

[DIBIASE19] The effects of change decomposition on code review — a controlled experiment. di Biase, Bruntink, van Deursen, Bacchelli. PeerJ Computer Science 5:e193, 2019, DOI 10.7717/peerj-cs.193 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — PeerJ + PMC mirror). A controlled experiment (n=28): decomposing a tangled change into coherent parts leads reviewers to report fewer wrongly reported issues (false positives) and to seek more context, while the number of defects found is unchanged. Grounds: untangling buys cleaner reviews, not more bugs caught — the honest reason to split work (ADR-0094).

[MOCKUS00] Predicting risk of software changes. Mockus & Weiss. Bell Labs Technical Journal 5(2):169–180, 2000, DOI 10.1002/bltj.2229 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — DOI + author bib; OA mirror mockus.org/papers/bltj13.pdf). Models the probability a change induces a failure as a function of change size, diffusion (files / modules / subsystems touched), developer experience, and change type (fault-fix vs new code); diffusion and experience are essential predictors (directional, no point thresholds). Grounds: weight review scrutiny by diffusion and change-type, not by greenfield-vs-brownfield (ADR-0094).

[PURUSHOTHAMAN05] Toward Understanding the Rhetoric of Small Source Code Changes. Purushothaman & Perry. IEEE TSE 31(6):511–526, 2005, DOI 10.1109/TSE.2005.74 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — author PDF + DBLP). A one-line change has under ~4% probability of introducing an error, but ~40% of fault-fix changes introduce one or more new defects. Grounds: fault-fixes are disproportionately fault-inducing → concentrate scrutiny on modification/fix changes (ADR-0094).

[GRAVES00] Predicting fault incidence using software change history. Graves, Karr, Marron, Siy. IEEE TSE 26(7):653–661, 2000, DOI 10.1109/32.859533 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — CrossRef + NISS TR; finding is qualitative). Process measures from the change history predict faults better than product metrics of the code: the number of times code has been changed (churn) predicts faults better than its size (LOC). Grounds: churn, not length, marks the risky loci a reviewer should weight (ADR-0094).

[HINDLE11] Got Issues? Do New Features and Code Improvements Affect Defects? Posnett, Hindle & Devanbu. WCRE 2011, pp. 211–215, DOI 10.1109/WCRE.2011.33 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — author PDF + DBLP). Counter-evidence: neither new features nor improvements have a significant effect on later defect counts once size and total number of changes are controlled — size/churn dominates, not new-vs-modified (scope: 4 Apache Java projects; the authors partly attribute the null to careful review of new features). Grounds: the Hindle caveat — never let "greenfield/net-new" justify skipping review on a large or high-diffusion change (ADR-0094).

[BOSU15] Characteristics of Useful Code Reviews: An Empirical Study at Microsoft. Bosu, Greiler, Bird. MSR 2015, pp. 146–156, DOI 10.1109/MSR.2015.21 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — MSR PDF + abstract). The more files in a change, the lower the proportion of review comments that are useful to the author (direction only, no point estimate). Grounds: files-touched is a first-class size signal for the oversized-packet heuristic — a sprawling change degrades review quality (ADR-0094).

[RIGBY13] Convergent Contemporary Software Peer Review Practices. Rigby & Bird. ESEC/FSE 2013, pp. 202–212, DOI 10.1145/2491411.2491444 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — MSR author PDF, text-extracted). Across drastically different projects, modern review converged on small changes — median change sizes of tens of lines (e.g. Android/AMD 44, Chrome 78; vs the prior-OSS Apache 25 / Linux 32 contrast and traditional inspection's 263). Grounds: small, self-contained units are the field-convergent norm a task should target (ADR-0094).

[MANTYLA09] What Types of Defects Are Really Discovered in Code Reviews? Mäntylä & Lassenius. IEEE TSE 35(3):430–448, 2009, DOI 10.1109/TSE.2008.71 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — Aalto repository PDF). Of 759 classified review defects (388 industrial + 371 student), roughly 75% do not affect visible functionality — they are evolvability defects (documentation, structure, readability) that execution-based QA cannot detect (confirming Siy & Votta). Grounds: review's primary payload is the maintainability/design layer tests are blind to (ADR-0095).

[BACCHELLI13] Expectations, Outcomes, and Challenges of Modern Code Review. Bacchelli & Bird. ICSE 2013, pp. 712–721, DOI 10.1109/ICSE.2013.6606617 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — author PDF). Over 570 Microsoft review comments, defect comments are a minority (~14%, 4th of nine categories) while code-improvement comments dominate (~29%); review's outcomes are less about finding errors than expected and also deliver knowledge transfer and team awareness. Grounds: foreground evolvability/design findings as first-class; defect-catching is one outcome among several (ADR-0095).

[MCINTOSH14] The Impact of Code Review Coverage and Participation on Software Quality (Qt, VTK, ITK). McIntosh, Kamei, Adams, Hassan. MSR 2014, pp. 192–201, DOI 10.1145/2597073.2597076 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — author/ACM). Coverage and participation each independently bear on quality: low coverage is estimated to add up to two post-release defects, low participation up to five — "coverage alone does not guarantee" quality. Grounds: substantive participation matters; a sign-off alone does not establish review quality (ADR-0095).

[GPTDROID] Make LLM a Testing Expert (GPTDroid): Human-like Mobile GUI Testing. Liu, Chen, Wang, et al. ICSE 2024, pp. 1222–1234, DOI 10.1145/3597503.3639180 (opens in new tab) (arXiv:2310.15780 (opens in new tab)). Verified (June 2026, web — arXiv). An LLM agent driving live Google Play apps found 53 new bugs, of which 35 were confirmed and fixed by developers. Grounds: an agent exercising the running app surfaces real defects — valuable as evidence, judged by a human/independent reviewer (ADR-0095).

[ITKONEN14] Are test cases needed? Replicated comparison between exploratory and test-case-based software testing. Itkonen & Mäntylä. Empirical Software Engineering 19(2):303–342, 2014, DOI 10.1007/s10664-013-9266-8 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — Springer). A replicated experiment (51 students, jEdit): no statistically significant difference in defect-detection effectiveness between exploratory and scripted testing (p=0.093); exploratory is more efficient (less design effort) and scripted yields more false positives. Scope: a student experiment; non-significant ≠ proven equivalence. Grounds: exercising the app (exploratory) is a legitimate verifier mode, not inferior to scripted (ADR-0095).

[WEBAGENTILLUSION] An Illusion of Progress? Assessing the Current State of Web Agents. Xue et al. (OSU-NLP). COLM 2025, arXiv:2504.01382 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — arXiv/OpenReview). On Online-Mind2Web (300 realistic tasks, 136 sites, human-judged), the best agents reach ~61% (Operator) / 56% (Claude Computer Use 3.7) while most cluster around ~30% — driving live web UIs reliably is still limited. Grounds: an agent's app-run is unreliable → it is evidence for a human to judge, never an autonomous verdict (ADR-0095).

[DOCROT] Detecting outdated code element references in software repository documentation. Tan, Wagner, Treude. Empirical Software Engineering 29:5, 2024, DOI 10.1007/s10664-023-10397-6 (opens in new tab) (companion tool paper arXiv:2307.04291 (opens in new tab)). Verified (June 2026, web — OA journal PDF). Across >3,000 GitHub projects (the 1,000 most-starred + Google's), 28.9% currently contain at least one outdated code-element reference, and 82.3% were outdated at least once historically. Scope: top-by-stars + Google repos — not generalizable to all docs. Grounds: doc rot is measurable and common; maintained documentation needs ownership and freshness rather than write-once treatment.

[CODECOMMENTCOEVO] A Large-Scale Empirical Study on Code-Comment Inconsistencies. Wen, Nagy, Bavota, Lanza. ICPC 2019, DOI 10.1109/ICPC.2019.00019 (opens in new tab) (author PDF, inf.usi.ch). Verified (June 2026, web — ICPC proceedings + author PDF). Code and its comments co-evolve only rarely: a code change triggers a corresponding comment change in just 13–20% of cases (≈7% for method comments, ≈13% for class comments). Grounds: documentation drifts silently because it is seldom updated with the code it describes; maintained docs benefit from ownership and mechanical reference checks.

[DOCPERSPECTIVE] Software Documentation: The Practitioners' Perspective. Aghajani, Nagy, Linares-Vásquez, Moreno, Bavota, Lanza, Shepherd. ICSE 2020, DOI 10.1145/3377811.3380405 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — author PDF inf.usi.ch + ICSE proceedings). A survey of 146 practitioners ranking documentation issues by perceived relevance found superfluous/bloated content (55%) and clone/duplicate content (46%) among the top maintainability concerns. Grounds: bloat and duplication are measured top documentation failures → the anti-bloat / single-sourcing discipline rests on the failure data, not on an unproven "minimal docs co-evolve better" claim (ADR-0108, ADR-0096).

[COMMENTSONCOMMENTS] Comments on Comments: Where Code Review and Documentation Meet. Rao et al. MSR 2022, arXiv:2204.00107 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web — ar5iv full text). Reviewers comment on a diff chunk 50.8% of the time when a code comment was changed vs 15.8% when only code changed (a documentation touch ≈3.2× the reviewer attention); a reviewer comment on a changed code comment leads to that comment being updated 76.4% (46K/61K) of the time. Grounds: review-on-touch is the cadence that keeps docs current — a doc change pulls reviewer scrutiny and that scrutiny lands the update (ADR-0108).

[CRITIC-TOOL] CRITIC: Large Language Models Can Self-Correct with Tool-Interactive Critiquing. Gou, Shao, Gong, Shen, Yang, Duan, Chen. ICLR 2024, arXiv:2305.11738 (opens in new tab). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch — venue + thesis; Table-2 figures via the roadmap-verification pass). A matched ablation isolates the lever: on GSM8k (text-davinci-003) tool-grounded critique lifts solve-rate +2.1 (PoT 70.1 → 72.2), while the identical pipeline without the tool DROPS it −1.8 (to 68.3) — free-form self-critique falls below the initial answer. Grounds: a review judgment must rest on a reliable external signal, not the model's own unsupported critique (ADR-0121, ADR-0095).

[NOSELFCORRECT] Large Language Models Cannot Self-Correct Reasoning Yet. Huang, Chen, Mishra, Zheng, Yu, Song, Zhou. ICLR 2024, arXiv:2310.01798 (opens in new tab). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch — venue + thesis; figures via the roadmap-verification pass). Without an external signal, intrinsic self-correction degrades: GSM8K 75.9 → 75.1 → 74.7 across rounds; CommonSenseQA 75.8 → 38.1. Grounds (with [CRITIC-TOOL], [SELFCORRECT]): ungrounded self-critique is not a correctness signal — the reliability comes from the external check, not the model re-judging itself (ADR-0121).

[AGENTPOISON] AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases. Chen, Xiang, Xiao, Song, Li. NeurIPS 2024 (per OpenReview; not shown on the arXiv abstract page), arXiv:2407.12784 (opens in new tab). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch — title + headline figures; venue per secondary source). An optimized-trigger backdoor on an agent's long-term memory / RAG store reaches >80% average attack-success at a <0.1% poison rate with <1% benign degradation, across autonomous-driving, QA, and healthcare agents. Grounds (with [MINJA]): memory poisoning is a real, low-footprint attack surface; native memories need evidence, boundaries, and correction so an injected record cannot masquerade as authoritative (ADR-0142). Magnitudes are QA/domain-benchmark, not code review — threat-motivated design, not a measured Suspec delta.

[CTXLENHURTS] Context Length Alone Hurts LLM Performance Despite Perfect Retrieval. Du, Tian, Ronanki, Rongali, Bodapati, Galstyan, Wells, Schwartz, Huerta, Peng. Findings of EMNLP 2025, ACL Anthology 2025.findings-emnlp.1264. Verified (July 2026, direct fetch — venue + figure). Task accuracy degrades 13.9%–85% as input length grows even with 100% exact retrieval and only minimal-distraction (whitespace/masked) padding — length alone, not retrieval failure; the effect is model-dependent (closed frontier models far more robust). Grounds: long-context degradation is a real, quantified phenomenon — distinct from stale-content hygiene, which is a different, unmeasured mechanism.

[SELFPREF-DBG] Beyond the Surface: Measuring Self-Preference in LLM Judgments. Chen, Wang, Zhang, Hu, Lin. EMNLP 2025 (main, pp. 1653–1672). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch of the ACL Anthology page). Introduces gold judgments as quality proxies and a DBG score isolating bias from quality: self-preference persists even when controlling for whether the model's own response is genuinely better. Grounds (with [SELFPREFER]): the implementer-≠-reviewer rule now has a quality-controlled, peer-reviewed leg (ADR-0119).

[MEMP] Memp: Exploring Agent Procedural Memory. Fang et al. ACL 2026 Findings, arXiv:2508.06433 (opens in new tab). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Distills trajectories into procedural memory with an explicit update / correct / remove-outdated regimen; success rates rise steadily as the repository is refined — the gain is attributed to maintenance, not accumulation. Grounds: native memory earns its keep only with correction and pruning discipline (ADR-0142).

[GOOGMIGRATE] Migrating Code At Scale With LLMs At Google. Ziftci, Nikolov, Sjövall, Kim, Codecasa, Kim. FSE 2025 (industry), DOI 10.1145/3696630.3728542 (opens in new tab), arXiv:2504.09691 (opens in new tab). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Twelve months, 39 real migrations, 595 changes / 93,574 edits: the LLM produced 74.45% of changes, in a staged workflow with per-change validation; developers estimated ~50% total-time reduction vs earlier manual migrations (self-estimated, not a controlled measurement — mark accordingly). Grounds: staged, per-change-validated migration at industrial scale — the change-plan/wave discipline's strongest external support (ADR-0094 adjacent).

Verified — additional primary research

[LOSTMID] Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contexts. Liu et al., TACL 2024. The U-shaped attention curve — accuracy degrades for information in the middle of long contexts. "Context rot" is a later popular term, not one coined by this paper. Grounds: minimize always-on context and keep load-bearing instructions easy to locate.

[SCOT] Structured Chain-of-Thought Prompting for Code Generation. Li, Li, Li, Jin. ACM TOSEM 34(2), Art. 37, 2025 (DOI 10.1145/3690635 (opens in new tab); preprint arXiv:2305.06599 (opens in new tab)). Verified (peer-reviewed). A structured intermediate (program-structured reasoning) beats free-form CoT for code generation (the paper reports +13.79% Pass@1). Grounds: a structured intermediate can beat free prose for downstream code work; this does not establish that every task needs one.

[SMELLS] Rapid Quality Assurance with Requirements Smells. Femmer, Méndez Fernández, Wagner, Eder. Journal of Systems and Software 123 (2017): 190–213 (DOI 10.1016/j.jss.2016.02.047 (opens in new tab)). Verified (peer-reviewed). Lightweight lexical detection of requirements "smells" (vague terms, comparatives, …) is feasible but precision is bounded (the study reports roughly 48–59% precision at ~82–87% recall). Grounds: prose-smell checks are advisory, never blocking — only a defined check grammar reaches blocking precision.

Verified — official guidance (authoritative vendor/spec docs, not empirical claims)

[SKILLBP] Skill authoring best practices. Anthropic Claude API docs. Official guidance: the ~500-line body cap, third-person descriptions, progressive disclosure, the explain-the-why pattern, anti-patterns. https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/agents-and-tools/agent-skills/best-practices (opens in new tab)official guidance, not a measured study; cite as design guidance.

[CTXENG] Effective context engineering for AI agents. Anthropic Engineering, 2025. Treats context as a finite resource, recommends just-in-time retrieval, and describes structured note-taking through a to-do list or NOTES.md; it does not prescribe a fixed file set. https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/effective-context-engineering-for-ai-agents (opens in new tab)official guidance.

[BUILDAGENTS] Building effective agents. Anthropic Engineering, 2024. Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Start-simple guidance: "find the simplest solution possible, and only increasing complexity when needed"; the most successful implementations used simple, composable patterns, not complex frameworks; frameworks "often create extra layers of abstraction that can obscure the underlying prompts and responses" and "make it tempting to add complexity when a simpler setup would suffice." https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents (opens in new tab)official guidance, not a measured study; cite as design guidance. Grounds: the minimum-useful-rigor default — add structure only where it earns its place (ADR-0131).

[SKILLSPEC] Open Agent Skills specification. agentskills.io. The SKILL.md shape, the 1024-char description cap, the progressive-disclosure model. https://agentskills.io/specification (opens in new tab)open standard.

[AGENTSMD-CONV] The AGENTS.md convention. agents.md — the cross-tool repository-context convention; the basis for the AGENTS.md > Commands contract. https://agents.md (opens in new tab)convention/standard.

[CCTASKS] Claude Code Tasks / Todo system. Anthropic, Claude Code (2026). Disk-persistent, dependency-aware task tracking — vendor-scale validation of externalised task state. https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code/changelog (opens in new tab)vendor doc.

[SPECKIT] GitHub Spec Kit — Spec-Driven Development toolkit. GitHub, 2025. Verified (June 2026, repo + docs + GitHub blog). Scaffolds per-feature spec foldersspecs/<NNN-feature>/ holding the spec + plan + tasks + research co-located — alongside a project-wide principles file (memory/constitution.md) and shared templates/; the flow is Spec → Plan → Tasks → Implement. https://github.com/github/spec-kit (opens in new tab) · https://github.github.com/spec-kit/ (opens in new tab)vendor toolkit; cite as convention, not a measured study. Comparator: a prominent repo-local specification workflow; ordinary Suspec artifacts remain outside repositories in the agent-neutral workspace.

[KIRO] Amazon Kiro — spec-driven development. AWS, 2025. Verified (June 2026, kiro.dev/docs/specs). Organizes each feature as .kiro/specs/<feature>/ with requirements.md + design.md + tasks.md, and writes requirements in EARS (Easy Approach to Requirements Syntax) — an established controlled-clause requirements syntax. https://kiro.dev/docs/specs/ (opens in new tab)vendor; cite as convention. Comparator: a repo-local specification workflow, and evidence that EARS is an established requirements-clause syntax.

[ADR-CONV] Architecture Decision Records — the convention. Nygard (2011); MADR template (adr.github.io); Fowler. Verified (June 2026). Decisions are recorded as short, immutable, sequentially-numbered Markdown files in a dedicated in-repo directory (decisions/ or docs/adr/), one decision per file, superseded rather than rewritten. https://adr.github.io/madr/ (opens in new tab) · https://martinfowler.com/bliki/ArchitectureDecisionRecord.html (opens in new tab)established convention. Grounds: the project-wide decisions/ home for ADRs and the supersession ledger.

[DIATAXIS] Diátaxis — a systematic framework for technical documentation. Procida. Verified (June 2026, diataxis.fr). Organizes documentation by user need into four distinct modes — tutorials, how-to guides, reference, explanation — kept separate because each serves a different purpose. https://diataxis.fr/ (opens in new tab)reference framework. Grounds: separate tutorials, reference, and explanation by the reader's need.

[GARTNER-AGENTS] Gartner agentic AI adoption projection. Gartner, 2025. Verified (July 2026, direct newsroom release). Projects 40% of enterprise applications will embed task-specific AI agents by the end of 2026, up from under 5% in 2025. https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2025-08-26-gartner-predicts-40-percent-of-enterprise-apps-will-feature-task-specific-ai-agents-by-2026-up-from-less-than-5-percent-in-2025 (opens in new tab)analyst projection, not a measured outcome. Grounds: agentic AI adoption is expected to expand rapidly.

[AI-INDEX-2026] Stanford HAI AI Index Report 2026. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI, 2026. Verified (July 2026, direct report chapter). Reports security and risk as the most frequently selected barrier to scaling agentic AI, cited by 62% of respondents; technical limitations and regulatory uncertainty were each selected by 38%. https://hai.stanford.edu/assets/files/ai_index_report_2026_chapter_3_responsible_ai.pdf (opens in new tab)secondary synthesis of a McKinsey survey; not a causal result. Grounds: security and risk are prominent reported adoption barriers.

[CSA-AI-CYBER-2026] State of AI Cybersecurity 2026. Cloud Security Alliance / Token Security, April 2026. Verified (June 2026, direct fetch of CSA research note). Survey of 1,500+ security leaders: 65% of enterprises with deployed AI agents experienced a confirmed security incident, 63% cannot enforce purpose limitations, and 60% cannot terminate a misbehaving agent once running. Grounds: operational controls for agentic AI lag behind adoption.

[NIST-CAISI-RFI] Summary Analysis of Responses to the Request for Information Regarding Security Considerations for AI Agents. NIST Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), NIST AI 800-5, 18 May 2026. Verified (July 2026, direct publication). Respondents widely agreed that agents present novel security threats and that established cybersecurity principles remain relevant but require adaptation for agent security. https://www.nist.gov/publications/summary-analysis-responses-request-information-regarding-security-considerations-ai (opens in new tab)government summary of public comments, not an independent empirical study. Grounds: agent security is an active standards and implementation gap.

[NIST-AI-AGENT-STANDARDS] NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative. NIST, announced 17 February 2026. Verified (July 2026, direct announcement). Organizes work around industry-led standards, community-led open-source protocol development, and research on agent security and identity. NIST says further research, guidelines, and deliverables will be announced in the months ahead; it does not publish a fixed delivery date. https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/02/announcing-ai-agent-standards-initiative-interoperable-and-secure (opens in new tab)official initiative announcement. Grounds: agent interoperability, security, and identity standards remain active work.

[GOOGLESA] Lessons from Building Static Analysis Tools at Google. Sadowski, Aftandilian, Eagle, Miller-Cushon, Jaspan. Communications of the ACM 61(4), April 2018 (DOI 10.1145/3188720 (opens in new tab)); the same criteria are restated in Software Engineering at Google (O'Reilly 2020), ch. 20 "Static Analysis". Verified (June 2026, direct fetch of the SWE-book ch.20 + the paper summary). Authoritative engineering field report (a CACM practitioner article + the Google engineering book), not peer-reviewed primary research — cited as authoritative guidance for a design target. A code-review-time check must "produce less than 10% effective false positives"; an issue is an "effective false positive" if developers did not take some positive action after seeing the issue — technical correctness is secondary (a correct-but-ignored report still counts against the budget; an incorrect report the developer fixes anyway does not). Compiler-integrated checks that fail the build are held to the stricter "no effective false positives." Grounds: the review-time precision target — a deterministic review check must clear ≤10% effective false positives or it gets --no-verify'd into irrelevance (the benchmark target in ADR-0086; reinforces the warning-not-hard-error posture for fuzzy checks alongside [[SMELLS]]).

[CODERABBIT-PRVAL] CodeRabbit — PR validation using linked issues. CodeRabbit, 2025–2026. Verified (June 2026, docs.coderabbit.ai + coderabbit.ai blog). The reviewer reads a linked Jira / Linear issue, validates whether the PR addresses the issue's acceptance criteria, and writes the assessment (validated vs needs-revision) back to the linked ticket. https://docs.coderabbit.ai/integrations/jira (opens in new tab)vendor feature doc; a shipped capability, not a measured study. Grounds (with [QODO]): requirement/acceptance-criteria binding in PR review is shipped by incumbents — Suspec's distinction is its deterministic, explicit-path, verdict-free form, not "binding evidence to requirements" by itself.

[QODO] Qodo Merge — Ticket Compliance Agent. Qodo (formerly CodiumAI), 2024–2026. Verified (June 2026, qodo.ai blog + qodo-merge-docs.qodo.ai/tools/compliance + PR Newswire launch). The code-review agent fetches a linked Jira / GitHub-Issues ticket, surfaces its acceptance criteria, and reports whether the diff is Fully / Partially / Not compliant — "identifies missing acceptance criteria, unimplemented steps," and markets scope-creep prevention and audit-ready evidence. https://qodo-merge-docs.qodo.ai/tools/compliance/ (opens in new tab)vendor feature doc; a shipped capability, not a measured study. Grounds (with [CODERABBIT-PRVAL]): requirement/acceptance-criteria binding in PR review is now shipped by incumbents — Suspec's distinction is its deterministic, explicit-path, verdict-free form, not "binding evidence to requirements" by itself.

[SARIF] Static Analysis Results Interchange Format (SARIF) v2.1.0. OASIS, approved as an OASIS Standard on 27 March 2020 (17 affirmative consents, no objections). Verified (June 2026, oasis-open.org). A JSON interchange format whose stated purpose is to make it feasible to aggregate the results of multiple static-analysis tools; ingested natively by GitHub code scanning and by reviewdog. https://www.oasis-open.org/standard/sarifv2-1-os/ (opens in new tab)ratified standard. Grounds: the deferred "import, don't rebuild" track — if Suspec ever ingests external analyzer findings, SARIF (with JUnit XML for test results) is the de-facto format to route and correlate against scope, never an analyzer to re-implement (ADR-0086 Decision 4).

[OVERRELIANCE-REVIEW] Overreliance on AI: Literature Review. Passi, Vorvoreanu, et al. Microsoft Research / Aether (AI, Ethics, and Effects in Engineering and Research), June 2022. Verified (June 2026, web search — direct fetch of the Aether review PDF). A Microsoft research literature review — a secondary synthesis of empirical studies, not itself a controlled study: the presence of explanations can increase over-reliance on AI, and more detailed explanations can make it worse — explanations often persuade rather than help a person evaluate, so they do not reliably improve human-AI team performance. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/overreliance-on-ai-literature-review/ (opens in new tab)authoritative vendor research synthesis; cite as guidance, not a single measured study (it is a review, not primary research). Grounds: favor short, verification-oriented justification over long persuasive prose; the goal of a recommendation's "why" is to make checking cheap, not to convince.

[GOOGLESMALLCL] Small CLs. Google Engineering Practices — Code Review Developer Guide (living document, accessed June 2026). The right size for a change is one self-contained change; ~100 lines is usually reasonable and ~1000 usually too large (rules of thumb, the reviewer's judgment; a change spread across many files counts as larger). Separate a refactor from a feature or bug-fix into its own change (small cleanups like renaming a local variable MAY ride along). https://google.github.io/eng-practices/review/developer/small-cls.html (opens in new tab)official guidance, not a measured study. Grounds: separate-refactor-from-behavior and small/self-contained units (ADR-0094).

[PLAYWRIGHTMCP] Playwright MCP. Microsoft (github.com/microsoft/playwright-mcp), accessed June 2026. Drives a browser via the accessibility tree, not pixels — "No vision models needed," deterministic, fast/lightweight. https://github.com/microsoft/playwright-mcp (opens in new tab)official project docs, not a measured study. Grounds: prefer deterministic accessibility-tree tooling over pixel/vision when an agent captures app-run evidence (ADR-0095).

[NARAGRS52] General Records Schedule 5.2: Transitory and Intermediary Records. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Transmittal No. 34, June 2023. The durability test: a record is durable when it is required "to initiate, sustain, evaluate, or provide evidence of decision-making"; transitory records are "routine records of short-term value (generally less than 180 days)," disposed of "when no longer needed." https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/grs/faqs-for-grs-5-2 (opens in new tab)primary-official (the issuing authority's schedule); "generally less than 180 days" is a typical bound, not a hard cutoff. Grounds: distinguish durable project records and native memories from transient working artifacts; durability follows the owning system, not a Suspec record store.

[ISO15489] ISO 15489-1:2016 — Records management — Concepts and principles. International Organization for Standardization, 2016. The records lifecycle: (recurrent) appraisal → disposition authorities, each setting a retention period and a disposition action — destruction, transfer, or archive for permanent retention. https://www.iso.org/standard/62542.html (opens in new tab)primary-official (paywalled; cite the catalog page for identity, the substance is the clause text). Grounds: records need an explicit disposition rather than indefinite accumulation; Suspec leaves that lifecycle to the system that owns the durable record.

[NYGARDADR] Documenting Architecture Decisions. Nygard, 2011. ADRs "are numbered sequentially and monotonically; numbers will not be reused"; each carries a status (proposed | accepted | deprecated | superseded); a reversed decision is kept and marked superseded "with a reference to its replacement" — not altered or deleted. https://cognitect.com/blog/2011/11/15/documenting-architecture-decisions (opens in new tab)primary-official (the post that originated the ADR pattern); "immutable" is later secondary framing, not Nygard's own word. Grounds: supersede-not-delete + sequential numbering + a status field for durable decision records (ADR-0096).

[MADR] Markdown Architectural Decision Records (MADR). The adr GitHub organization, MADR 4.0.0, 2024. ADRs live in a docs/decisions/ folder named NNNN-title-with-dashes.md (a consecutive number; "we assume that there won't be more than 9,999 ADRs in one repository"); the template carries a status field with example values (proposed | rejected | accepted | deprecated | … | superseded by ADR-NNNN). https://adr.github.io/madr/ (opens in new tab)primary-official (the project's own docs); the status values are illustrative, not a closed set. Grounds: the NNNN scheme + a status field scale to thousands of records (ADR-0096).

[ISO42010] ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2022 — Software, systems and enterprise — Architecture description. ISO/IEC/IEEE, 2nd edition, November 2022. Verified (July 2026, ISO catalog + the standard's conceptual-model site). The standard's architecture-description model treats architecture decisions, the concerns they address, and architecture rationale as first-class concepts; rationale records the explanation or justification for decisions and rejected alternatives. https://www.iso.org/standard/74393.html (opens in new tab) · https://www.iso-architecture.org/ieee-1471/cm/ — primary-official identity plus the standard editors' conceptual summary; the full standard is paywalled. Grounds: recording durable decisions with rationale aligns with the standard's conceptual model; the NNNN and supersede-not-rewrite format remains the [[NYGARDADR]] / [[MADR]] convention (ADR-0096).

[ISO29148] ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2018 — Systems and software engineering — Life cycle processes — Requirements engineering. ISO/IEC/IEEE, 2nd edition, 2018. Verified (June 2026, iso.org catalog). Specifies the requirements-engineering processes and the characteristics of a good requirement (necessary, unambiguous, verifiable, traceable, …) plus the required information items that carry them across the life cycle. https://www.iso.org/standard/72089.html (opens in new tab)primary-official (paywalled; cite the catalog page for identity). Grounds: requirements are verifiable, traceable, stably identified information items — the standard backing for Suspec's acceptance-criteria discipline.

[GHRETENTION] GitHub Actions artifact & log retention. GitHub Docs, accessed June 2026. Workflow artifacts and logs are retained 90 days by default — configurable 1–90 days for public repos, up to 400 for private. https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/managing-organization-settings/configuring-the-retention-period-for-github-actions-artifacts-and-logs-in-your-organization (opens in new tab)primary-official. Grounds: CI evidence is often retained temporarily, so a durable claim must not depend on an assumed-permanent run log.

[GLRETENTION] GitLab CI/CD job artifacts — default expiry. GitLab Docs, accessed June 2026. Job artifacts expire 30 days after creation by default (overridable per job via expire_in, or kept indefinitely with expire_in: never). https://docs.gitlab.com/ci/jobs/job_artifacts/ (opens in new tab)primary-official. Grounds: with GitHub's default ([[GHRETENTION]]), confirms that linked CI evidence may expire and needs an inspectable durable anchor when the claim must outlive the run.

[SWEGBOOKDOCS] Software Engineering at Google, ch. 10 "Documentation". Manshreck (eds. Winters, Manshreck, Wright), O'Reilly, 2020. "Documents without owners become stale"; freshness metadata can "send email reminders when the document hasn't been touched in, for example, three months"; at scale a dominant failure mode is duplication, not just absence (the GooWiki / Borg case — 7–10 overlapping Borg-setup docs, no owner). https://abseil.io/resources/swe-book/html/ch10.html (opens in new tab)practitioner-credible (industry book, not peer-reviewed); the 3-month figure is an example, not a rule. Grounds: maintained project documentation needs ownership and freshness; transient working specs should not become duplicate documentation.

Verified — peer-reviewed, no measured outcomes (vision/position; design rationale only)

[REDEFO] Requirements Development and Formalization for Reliable Code Generation: A Multi-Agent Vision. Sun et al. (Weisong Sun, corresponding). ASE 2025 (NIER track), arXiv:2508.18675 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, conf.researchr.org + arXiv). A vision paper (New Ideas & Emerging Results — peer-reviewed venue, no measured outcomes): proposes Analyst + Formalizer agents that turn ambiguous NL requirements into formal specifications to bridge NL→code, with human-in-the-loop review at critical points. Cite as design rationale / corroboration only (never a measured MUST) — it corroborates the spec-as-contract + clarify-before-build direction; the measured grounding for that spine remains [PLANCODER]/[SEMAP]/[MAST]/[SMELLS].

[EVALAI] Explainable AI is Dead, Long Live Explainable AI! Hypothesis-driven Decision Support using Evaluative AI. Miller. ACM FAccT 2023 (DOI 10.1145/3593013.3594001 (opens in new tab)), arXiv:2302.12389 (opens in new tab). Verified (June 2026, web search — ACM DL + arXiv). A position paper (peer-reviewed venue, no measured outcomes): argues that giving a recommendation-plus-explanation takes agency from the decision-maker and misfits how people actually decide; proposes evaluative AI — a machine-in-the-loop that surfaces evidence for and against the options rather than pushing a single accept/reject recommendation. Cite as design rationale only (never a measured MUST) — and note it is contested (a position paper; later work found no automatic decision-quality gain from options-over-recommendations). Grounds: the decision handoff presents comparable options with the case for and against, not a lone recommendation — but as a reasoned design stance, not a proven result.

Caveated — non-peer-reviewed (cite ONLY as preliminary; never load-bearing)

These sources may illustrate a direction but never ground a MUST. Their headline statistics are single-author or industry measurements, not controlled peer-reviewed studies.

[WIEGERS95] Improving Quality Through Software Inspections. Wiegers. Software Development magazine, April 1995 (author reprint, processimpact.com). Verified (June 2026, web — author PDF). The desk-checking principle: the author is a poor sole reviewer of their own work — "if the author was aware of defects, he probably would have corrected them already"; flags "a sense of unease when the author is the only person who has viewed a completed product." https://www.processimpact.com/articles/inspects.pdf (opens in new tab)practitioner / trade article, not peer-reviewed; cite as design rationale only, never as measured evidence. Grounds: the cognitive rationale for reviewer ≠ author (reinforces ADR-0056), at design-rationale level (ADR-0095).

[ACTIVATION-BLOG] Why Claude Code Skills Don't Activate — And How to Fix It. Seleznov, Medium, 2026. A self-published 650-trial measurement reporting directive descriptions activating far more reliably than passive ones (the "OR ≈ 20.6 / 100% activation" figures). Non-peer-reviewed; the specific numbers are NOT load-bearing. The direction (directive, exclusion-bearing descriptions help) is used only as illustration; Suspec skills use explicit trigger and exclusion language, while direct invocation remains available.

[DORA2025] DORA 2025 — State of AI-assisted Software Development. Google Cloud / DevOps Research and Assessment, 2025. Venue + framing web-verified (June 2026, dora.dev/research/2025); the percentages are the report's own self-reported figures (the public landing pages don't expose them for re-fetch — figures corroborated via the report body in earlier multi-source verification). ~90% of technology professionals use AI at work and >80% report it improved their productivity (self-reported, not measured); the report's thesis is that AI is an "amplifier" of an organization's existing strengths and weaknesses — higher adoption is associated with both increased delivery throughput and increased instability absent strong control / internal-platform systems. Tier: vendor/industry report, correlational, self-reported — never a MUST. Grounds (illustrative): agent adoption can amplify instability where verification and operational controls are weak; Suspec addresses that risk through explicit intent, evidence, and independent review. Pairs with [METR]'s perception-vs-reality gap.

Preprints — web-verified arXiv (finding confirmed; cite as preliminary, never a MUST)

A web-verified arXiv preprint is stronger than a blog post but is not peer-reviewed: it may corroborate or illustrate a direction, never carry a MUST. Each finding below was confirmed against the source (June 2026).

[PERSUASIONPARADOX] The Persuasion Paradox: When LLM Explanations Fail to Improve Human-AI Team Performance. Cohen, Feng, Bloch, Kraus. arXiv:2604.03237 (preprint, 2026). Verified (June 2026, id + abstract). Three controlled studies; the result is explicitly task-dependent / mediated by cognitive modality — on visual reasoning (RAVEN matrices) explanations inflate confidence without accuracy and suppress error recovery, but on language-based logical reasoning (LSAT) "LLM explanations yield the highest accuracy and recovery rates, outperforming both expert-written explanations and probability-based support." The paper rejects treating explanations as a universal solution. Grounds (preliminary, mixed): on the visual task it corroborates the over-reliance/"calibration cues over persuasion" direction; on the language task — the class closer to a developer's decision — explanations helped, which cuts the other way. Cite only as preliminary, never a MUST; do not read it as a one-directional "replicate and intensify."

[IFSCALE] How Many Instructions Can LLMs Follow at Once? Jaroslawicz et al. arXiv:2507.11538 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, id + abstract). A 500-instruction density benchmark across 20 frontier models: best models ~68% accuracy at 500 simultaneous instructions; top reasoning models hold near-perfect adherence through ~100–150 before degrading; failures shift to silent omission with a primacy bias toward earlier instructions. Grounds (preliminary): order important requirements early and keep instruction sets lean. The study does not establish a page-length threshold.

[SWEMUT] Saving SWE-Bench: A Benchmark Mutation Approach for Realistic Agent Evaluation. arXiv:2510.08996 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, id + abstract). Mutating formal GitHub-issue task descriptions into realistic short chat queries (telemetry-derived) drops agent resolution so far that public benchmarks overestimate capability by >50% for some models (~10–16% on an internal benchmark). Grounds: specification richness in the task input is load-bearing for agent success; terse prompting measurably underperforms.

[ASKORASSUME] Ask or Assume? Uncertainty-Aware Clarification-Seeking in Coding Agents. arXiv:2603.26233 (2026 preprint; id + abstract verified June 2026 — 69.40% confirmed in the abstract; the 70.80/54.80/47.20 results-section figures are entry-recorded but unverified beyond it; cite as preliminary only). On an underspecified SWE-bench Verified variant: full issue 70.80% vs underspecified 54.80% resolve rate (specification completeness alone ≈16 pts); calibrated clarification recovers to 69.40%; an always-clarify baseline was WORST (47.20%). Grounds (preliminary): spec completeness and clarification are substitutable; indiscriminate clarification hurts.

[REACODER] Bridging the Gap between User Intent and LLM: A Requirement Alignment Approach for Code Generation. arXiv:2604.16198 (2026 preprint). Verified (June 2026, id + abstract; the ablation figures below are from the body and unverified beyond this entry). Requirement alignment before generation improves pass rates over all baselines across 4 models / 5 benchmarks (avg +7.9% to +30.3%); ablations attribute gains to both upfront QA-alignment (+5.82%) and checking generated code back against the requirement (+9.99%); costs more tokens than zero-shot. Preliminary; never a MUST-level ground.

[AGENTSMD-HARM] Evaluating AGENTS.md. Gloaguen, Mündler, Müller, Raychev, Vechev (ETH Zürich + LogicStar.ai). arXiv:2602.11988 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). Two findings: (1) repository-specific commands are used far more often when named in the context file than when not (≈1.6×, p=0.01; ≈2.5×, p=0.05) — corroborates the Commands contract; (2) over-specification hurts — LLM-generated narrative context files reduced task success by ~3% while raising inference cost by over 20%, and even developer-written ones gave only a small gain at added cost. Its efficiency companion (Lulla et al., arXiv:2601.20404 (opens in new tab)) is a contrasting result — developer-written AGENTS.md reduced runtime (~28.6%) and tokens (~16–20%); the two do not jointly establish "narrative is costly" and must not be cited as if they do. Grounds: the minimality / anti-bloat discipline (fewer, scoped, command-naming context files; not more narrative). Where the AGENTS.md > Commands contract cites this (ADR-0018, ADR-0038), treat it as corroborating evidence — the contract's normative force rests on the [AGENTSMD-CONV] convention and the design reasoning, not on this preprint.

[FORMATTAX] The Format Tax. Lee et al. arXiv:2604.03616 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). The cost of format-restriction is paid mostly at the prompt (−3.9pp), not the decoder (−1.6pp); decoupling (reason free-form, then emit) recovers +6.8 / +9.2pp, and frontier models pay near-zero tax. Corroborates [FORMATFREE]; grounds the reason-then-emit rule.

[EVIBOUND] Evidence-Bound Autonomous Research. Chen. arXiv:2511.05524 (preprint; small N=8 — illustrative). Verified (June 2026). Prompt-only completion governance produced ~100% hallucinated "done" claims; dual machine-checkable gates drove that to 0%. Illustrates: bind "done"/"true" to a checkable evidence anchor, not a prose assertion.

[SWESKILLS] SWE-Skills-Bench: Do Agent Skills Actually Help in Real-World Software Engineering? Han, Zhang, Song, Fang, Chen, Sun, Hu. arXiv:2603.15401 (preprint). Verified (June 2026; re-verified July 2026, direct fetch — title and figures confirmed). Of 49 candidate skills, 39 gave zero pass-rate improvement (average gain +1.2%), 3 degraded performance up to −10pp, and only 7 specialized skills produced meaningful gains (up to +30%). Grounds: generic skills are mostly inert — read WITH [SKILLSBENCH26], which shows curated task-matched skills gain +16.6pp: the operative variable is curation and task-fit, not the skill mechanism itself.

[ORACLESWE] ORACLE-SWE. Li et al. arXiv:2604.07789 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). A reproduction test is far more valuable than prose plans for issue resolution (plans were not worth isolating as a signal). Grounds: machine-checkable/executable evidence beats machine-readable prose.

[CITECHECK] Citation-resolution checking. Rao et al. arXiv:2604.03173; CiteGuard arXiv:2510.17853 (preprints). Verified (June 2026). An automated citation-resolving checker cut non-resolving citations 16%→0.6% (≈26×) and 6.1%→0.1% (≈79×), p<10⁻³⁵; LLMs otherwise fabricate 78–90% of citations, and structured validation recovers near-human accuracy. Grounds: provenance pays off only when an automated pass resolves the referent (provenance must be lint-enforced, not a convention).

[NOFREE] No Free Labels. arXiv:2503.05061 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). LLM-judge / reward-model agreement collapses (κ ≈ 0.86 → 0.30) without a reference answer. Grounds: an LLM judge without a grounded reference is not a verifier.

[CONSENSUS] Consensus is Not Verification. arXiv:2603.06612 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). Multi-agent voting / self-consistency amplifies shared errors rather than catching them. Grounds (with [CORRELATED]): consensus is not a correctness signal.

[MULTITURN-LOST] LLMs Get Lost in Multi-Turn Conversation. arXiv:2505.06120 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). Multi-turn performance drops ~39% with a ~112% rise in unreliability, triggered by under-specification. Affirms: keep load-bearing meaning on a stable, typed surface, re-read each pass; prose is an unreliable cross-turn carrier.

[MAST] Multi-Agent System failure Taxonomy (MAST). Cemri et al. arXiv:2503.13657 (preprint; venue unconfirmed). Verified (June 2026; finding confirmed, venue not). 14 failure modes across three categories — system-design & specification ≈41.8%, inter-agent misalignment ≈36.9%, verification ≈21.3% (so specification + verification ≈ 63%). Note (audit O-0): the first category is "System Design / poor specification," not "Specification" alone. Grounds: why Suspec hardens the specification and verification layers; the inter-agent contract gap.

[SEMAP] Structured/contract-based multi-agent protocol (SEMAP). Mao et al. arXiv:2510.12120 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). Contracts + structured inter-agent messaging + lifecycle verification cut failures 64–70%, with the largest single win in under-specification (71–73%). Grounds: structured requirements, explicit handoffs, and evidence-backed review; the inter-agent coordination contract.

[REPORTLOGIC] Agent-report quality axis. arXiv:2602.18446 (preprint). Verified (June 2026). A primary quality axis of an agent's report is an explicit claim → support structure. Grounds: the evidence-before-conclusion / claim-must-carry-evidence rule for findings and audits.

[PLANCODER] Understanding and Bridging the Planner-Coder Gap. Lyu et al. arXiv:2510.10460 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, audit O-0). The planner→coder gap "accounts for 75.3% of failures"; semantic-preserving input mutations break 7.9–83.3% of previously-solved problems; a monitor agent repairs 40–89%. Grounds: the plan-to-implementation handoff is a major multi-agent code-generation failure surface, so intent and scope must survive dispatch intact.

[VERINA] VERINA: Benchmarking Verifiable Code Generation. Ye et al. arXiv:2505.23135 / OpenReview (preprint; not ICML 2025). Verified (June 2026, audit O-0). On 189 Lean tasks the best model (o3) reached 72.6% code / 52.3% spec but a mere 4.9% end-to-end proof success (one trial). Grounds: one-shot LLM proof is near-total failure → staged/assisted verification (the verify rationale).

[VERICODING] A Benchmark for Vericoding: Formally Verified Program Synthesis. Bursuc et al. arXiv:2509.22908 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, audit O-0). ~12,504 specs; best-approach success is language-specific — Dafny 82% (68%→96% over a year), Verus 44%, Lean 27%. Cite the language-specific framing only; do NOT generalize to "mechanized proof is no longer single-digit" (Lean is still 27%, consistent with [VERINA]'s 4.9%).

[HILBENCH] HiL-Bench: Do Agents Know When to Ask for Help? arXiv:2604.09408 (preprint; not yet peer-reviewed). Verified (June 2026). Frontier agents solve up to ~89% of SWE/SQL tasks with full info, but on messy/ambiguous specs the best model drops to ~24% even when given a tool to ask for help. Grounds: agents do not reliably self-clarify, so unresolved ambiguity must be surfaced before implementation.

[PBR] Perspective-Based Reading. Basili, Green, Laitenberger, Lanubile, Shull, Sørumgård, Zelkowitz. Empirical Software Engineering 1(2), 1996 (with later replications). Verified (July 2026, established SE technique). Assigning reviewers distinct perspectives (e.g. tester / developer / user) gives better defect coverage than the same number of readers each reading the same way — coverage comes from perspective diversity, not reviewer count. Grounds: the review stance pool is a set of distinct perspectives, and cycling them is how coverage is bought without a large simultaneous panel (with [[DIVSCALE]]).

[ENSEMBLEDIV] Ensemble Monitoring for AI Control: Diverse Signals Outweigh More Compute. Koran, Yun, Tetef, Arnav, Bernabeu-Pérez. arXiv:2605.15377 (2026 preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch — title + thesis confirmed; the widely-summarized "k=3 marginal-gain ceiling / >95%" figure was NOT confirmed against the primary text, so it is deliberately not carried here as a number). Thesis: signal diversity beats raw ensemble size / compute — correlated members add little. Grounds (preliminary): a few varied, cheaper reviewers beat more identical or more expensive ones — the cheap-plus-varied reviewer default; with [[DIVSCALE]], [[CONSENSUS]]. (This entry is itself an honesty marker: a number that appeared in secondary summaries did not survive primary verification and so is not stated as fact.)

[DIVSCALE] Understanding Agent Scaling in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems via Diversity. Yang, Qu, Wen, Shi, Wen, Zhang, Wierman, Gu. arXiv:2602.03794 (2026 preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Full-diversity (distinct model + persona) at 2 agents matches/exceeds homogeneous fan-out at 16 agents (Vote ~67.7 vs ~65.3), averaged over 7 QA/reasoning benchmarks — but read the mechanism honestly: the 8× ratio is largely a saturation artifact of the homogeneous baseline (marginal gain per identical agent collapses toward zero past N≈4–8), and the matched-count diversity delta is only ~3–6pp (+4.4 Vote / +3.3 Debate). All numbers are 7–8B open-weight models on academic QA/math; transfer to code review is untested (the paper lists agentic workflows as unevaluated). Grounds (preliminary): prefer a few genuinely diverse reviewers over more identical copies (the ordering), not "diversity is large" (the ratio).

[CONSENSUSCOST] The Cost of Consensus: reviewer independence vs peer-rationale exchange. Bertalanič, Fortuna. arXiv:2605.00914 (2026 preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch — full-text noise control checked). Reading peers' raw same-round outputs induces modal sycophancy up to 85.5% and discards already-correct answers (oracle gap up to 32.3pp); isolated self-correction matched or beat debate (MMLU-Hard 66.7% vs 60.7%, p<0.001) at 2–3× lower token cost. Caveat that bounds the mechanism: task-irrelevant peer rationales performed equal-or-better than real ones — the authors attribute failure to RLHF sycophantic conformity, not Condorcet/correlated-error diversity collapse, and the tested cure is total isolation, not an "adjudicated summary." All 7–8B same-model math/QA debaters. Grounds (preliminary): withholding raw same-round reviewer outputs is evidence-consistent; the exchange-format remedy is open, not settled.

[FLIPFLOP] The FlipFlop Experiment: ungrounded challenge degrades LLM answers. Laban et al. arXiv:2311.08596 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). An ungrounded challenge ("are you sure?") causes an average ~17% accuracy drop with a 46% answer-flip rate across 10 LLMs and 7 tasks — models abandon correct answers under social pressure absent any new evidence. Grounds (with [CRITIC-TOOL], [NOSELFCORRECT]): critique must rest on a reliable, actionable signal, not model self-doubt or rhetorical pressure (ADR-0121).

[BIGGERNOTBETTER] Bigger Isn't Always Better: A Comparative Evaluation of LLMs for Automated Code Review. Kumar, Bararia, Raj. arXiv:2606.15689 (2026 preprint — vendor-produced: a VibeOps project; VibeOps sells LLM code review). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Two signals must be separated. Robust and uncontested: the synthetic→real collapse — F1 0.847 → 0.066 (~92% drop) on real bug-fix PRs, plus a diff-size cliff (F1 0.657 <10 lines → 0.043 >150 lines, ~15×). Weak / not significant: the "smaller wins" gap (Haiku 4.5 F1 0.365 vs Sonnet 0.343) is admittedly non-significant (the paper's own Limitation #6), and Sonnet wins on precision + severity-weighted F1; an independent academic benchmark (CR-Bench, arXiv:2603.11078 (opens in new tab)) finds the stronger model wins on recall/F1/SNR ("model scale matters"). Grounds (preliminary): validate any model/preset on real PRs matched to the target diff-size regime, and do not key a routing ladder to model size/tier — it is non-monotonic for review.

[SKILLSWILD] Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale. arXiv:2601.10338 (2026 preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Across n=31,132 marketplace skills: 26.1% carry ≥1 vulnerability, 5.2% show high-severity malicious-intent patterns, 13.3% data-exfiltration; and script-bearing skills are 2.12× more likely to be vulnerable than instruction-only (OR=2.12, p<0.001). Grounds (preliminary): a conservative, instruction-only, no-executable-script skill v1 is a low-cost base-rate reducer — one defense-in-depth layer, not solved safety. Base rates are consumer marketplaces, not a code-review deployment.

[REVBOTPR] On the Footprints of Reviewer-Bot Feedback on Agentic Pull Requests in OSS GitHub Repositories. arXiv:2604.24450 (2026 preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). On 4,532 real PRs / 7,416 comments: higher review-comment volume correlates with longer resolution (Spearman ρ=0.19, adj_p=7e-13) and lower relevance (ρ=−0.20) and clarity (ρ=−0.19) — added review volume dilutes rather than adds. Grounds (preliminary, code-review-native): measure marginal unique-accepted-finding value and stop early; more reviewer output is not more signal.

[SINGLEBEATSMAS] Single-Agent LLMs Can Outperform Multi-Agent Systems Under Equal Thinking-Token Budgets. Tran, Kiela (Stanford). arXiv:2604.02460 (2026 preprint). Verified (July 2026, search + abstract). Under a matched thinking-token budget, a single agent (0.427) beat all five MAS variants — including heterogeneous debate / role-specialist designs (best MAS 0.420) — on FRAMES/MuSiQue, grounded in the Data Processing Inequality (inter-agent messages can only lose information); MAS won only under degraded-context regimes. Grounds (preliminary): a live counter-consideration — before fanning out reviewers at all, weigh equal-compute accounting; fan-out is not a free lunch.

[MEMGRAFT] MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval. arXiv:2512.16962 (2025 preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Poisoning ~9% of an agent's memory (10/110 records) caused 47.9% of retrievals to surface the poisoned record — trigger-free and persistent until purge — establishing that similarity-retrieved memory with no source/transformation metadata is unguarded. Grounds (with [MINJA], [AGENTPOISON]): provenance-before-trust and correction are the design levers; a native memory remains a claim with evidence, not a second source of truth (ADR-0142).

[MEMBENCH-CAVEAT] Memory-system outcome benchmarks (Mem0, Zep) are contested and instrument-limited. Mem0 (arXiv:2504.19413 (opens in new tab), ECAI 2025); Zep (arXiv:2501.13956 (opens in new tab)); with the LoCoMo audits. Verified (July 2026, direct fetch + issue-tracker review). The headline "memory improves outcomes" numbers do not survive scrutiny as load-bearing: Mem0 fails independent reproduction (~0.20 vs published), a plain full-context baseline (~73% J) beats Mem0 (~68%) on Mem0's own LoCoMo data, and the LoCoMo instrument is invalid below ~63% (6.4% of its answer key is wrong; its LLM judge accepts 62.8% of intentionally-wrong answers). Zep's 84%→58.44% is a contested vendor cross-accusation, not a settled correction. All deltas are conversational-QA; none transfer to code workflows. Grounds (do-not-load-bear): justify memory by the trust/provenance argument ([MEMGRAFT], [AGENTPOISON], [MINJA]), never by a measured outcome gain.

[INSTRROT] Instruction-file rot: prevalence measured, output-quality effect unmeasured. "Context Rot in AI-Assisted Software Development" (Treude & Baltes, arXiv:2606.09090 (opens in new tab)); "Configuration Smells in AGENTS.md Files" (arXiv:2606.15828 (opens in new tab)). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Stale/inconsistent agent-instruction files are prevalent — referential rot in 23.0% of 356 repos (DOCER checker; per-file stale rate only 1.0–1.4%, 24% false positives), config smells in 91/100 repos — but no primary source measures whether staleness degrades agent OUTPUT quality; both defer behavioral impact to future work. Grounds (preliminary): treat stale native memory and instructions as human-resolved inconsistency hygiene; do not claim a quality-degradation effect (a hypothesis, not a result) — distinct from the measured context-length effect [CTXLENHURTS].

[OVEREAGER] Overeager Coding Agents: Measuring Out-of-Scope Actions on Benign Tasks. Qu, Zhang, Zhang, Deng, Li, Zhang, Liu. arXiv:2605.18583 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Stripping the scope/consent declaration alone raises the overeager (out-of-scope action) rate 0.0% → 17.1% on paired scenarios (+11.9 to +17.2pp across frameworks). Grounds: explicit scope declarations measurably suppress out-of-scope agent actions — the Non-goals/Do-not-change rationale, now with a number.

[IMPOSSIBLE] ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Cases. Zhong, Raghunathan, Carlini. arXiv:2510.20270 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch of full text). Under a bare prohibition ("DO NOT MODIFY THE TESTS") cheating exceeds 85% (GPT-5, o3); the strictest prompt with explicit STOP directives lowers it to 1% (GPT-5) / 33% (o3); adding an abort/flag-for-human option cuts cheating 54%→9% (GPT-5) / 49%→12% (o3), with model-dependent effect (minimal on Opus 4.1). Grounds: bare "do not X" is weak; pair a prohibition with an explicit stop-and-ask escape.

[MEMDECAY] How Memory Management Impacts LLM Agents: An Empirical Study of Experience-Following Behavior. Xiong, Lin, Xie, He, Liu, Tang, Lakkaraju, Xiang. arXiv:2505.16067 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Indiscriminate add-all experience accumulation degrades performance over time via error propagation and misaligned experience replay; regulating experience quality in the memory bank restores it. Grounds: deciding what becomes native memory is load-bearing, not clerical hygiene (ADR-0142; with [MEMP]).

[MEMCODER] Your Code Agent Can Grow Alongside You with Structured Memory. Deng, Liu, Zhang, Yang, Yang. arXiv:2603.13258 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Structured historical experience (intent-to-code mappings distilled from past commits, with self-refinement) yields +9.4% resolved rate on SWE-bench Verified over the DeepSeek-V3.2 baseline. Grounds: curated durable memory can measurably help a code agent — the positive half of the memory story ([MEMDECAY] is the boundary).

[CCR] Cross-Context Review: Improving LLM Output Quality by Separating Production and Review Sessions. Song. arXiv:2603.12123 (preprint; single author, 30 artifacts / 150 injected errors / 360 reviews — small N). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Fresh-context review reached F1 28.6% vs 24.6% same-session self-review, 23.8% context-aware subagent, 21.7% repeated self-review (significant); repetition without separation did not help. Grounds: fresh-context isolation for independent review, directly if modestly supported.

[SELFREVIEW-MOD] Articulate but Wrong: Self-Review Failures in LLM-Based Code Modernization. Purnachandra Reddy, Lolla, Sanku. arXiv:2605.21537 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Across 1,980 modernization attempts / 11 models, ~40% of problem snippets had semantic-preservation failures and 31.7% were silently endorsed by the model that produced them — some models articulate the exact semantic hazard, then declare preservation anyway. Grounds: self-review is structurally unreliable at the write layer; independence is not optional (ADR-0119).

[EXPERTSBACK] Multi-Agent Teams Hold Experts Back. Pappu, El, Cao, di Nolfo, Sun, Cao, Zou. arXiv:2602.01011 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Self-organizing LLM teams underperform their best member by up to 41.1% via "integrative compromise" — averaging expert and non-expert views; worsens with team size. Grounds: a review lead must union-and-reconcile findings, never majority-filter — consensus aggregation dilutes the best reviewer (ADR-0122's lead design; the union-not-vote clarification — a vote remains only for a contested rejection).

[PLANCOMPLY] Evaluating Plan Compliance in Autonomous Programming Agents. Liu, Dehghan, Ganhotra, Hirzel, Jabbarvand. arXiv:2604.12147 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). 16,991 SWE-agent trajectories: providing a standard plan improves resolution, and periodic plan reminders further improve compliance and success — agents without guidance revert to overfitted training patterns. Grounds: a re-surfaced plan can measurably shape execution when the work earns one, with the staleness boundary at [INSTRROT]/[CTXLENHURTS].

[SELFPLAN] Self-planning Code Generation with Large Language Models. Jiang, Wang, Wang, Zhang, Lian, Li, Jin. arXiv:2303.06689 (preprint; later TOSEM). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch — abstract figure confirmed). Eliciting a short plan before implementation gives a relative +25.4% Pass@1 over direct code generation across benchmarks. Grounds (preliminary, the counterweight to the "ceremony is inert" read): a targeted, execution-shaping structure — a lean plan the coder then follows — measurably helps, distinct from generic process artifact ([[SWESKILLS]]/[[SKILLSBENCH26]] show the inert kind); pairs with [[PLANCOMPLY]] (plan + reminders improve compliance). The doctrine that structure earns its place by changing execution, not by existing (ADR-0131).

[SKILLSBENCH26] SkillsBench: Benchmarking How Well Agent Skills Work Across Diverse Tasks. Li et al. (77 authors). arXiv:2602.12670 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Curated, task-matched skills raise average pass rate 33.9% → 50.5% (+16.6pp; per-config +4.1 to +25.7pp); focused skills of ≤3 modules beat larger bundles; skilled smaller models rival unskilled larger ones. Grounds (with [SWESKILLS]): the split is curation and task-fit, not skills-yes/no — generic skills mostly do nothing, task-matched ones pay; keep skill bodies small and matched.

[FALSESUCCESS] From Confident Closing to Silent Failure: Characterizing False Success in LLM Agents. Advani. arXiv:2606.09863 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). False success is 45–48% of failures where only the agent's self-report is available vs ~3% where the environment exposes independently observable ground truth (~15×); lightweight statistical detectors beat LLM judges at catching it. Grounds: the evidence rule's target failure mode, quantified — claims need independently checkable state, not confident prose.

[SILENTSEM] Confident and Wrong: Silent Semantic Failures in Coding Agents. Mehta. arXiv:2603.25764 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Frontier agents submit near-always (99–100%) while resolving 18–44%; silent semantic failures affect 68–80% of failing runs and are invisible to completion metrics. Grounds (with [FALSESUCCESS]): completion claims are near-worthless as evidence; independent, evidence-backed review addresses a measured, severe failure class.

[UNDERSPEC-HELPS] When Prompt Under-Specification Improves Code Correctness. Akli, Papadakis, Cordy, Le Traon. arXiv:2604.24712 (preprint). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Counter-evidence with a mechanism: reducing specification can improve correctness by breaking misleading lexical/structural cues that trigger wrong retrieval-based strategies in over-detailed prompts. Grounds: prefer a lean spec over exhaustive specification when added detail does not change execution; detail is not free (with [HUMANEVALCOMM]'s indiscriminate-clarification result).

[MISALIGN20K] How Coding Agents Fail Their Users: A Large-Scale Analysis of Developer-Agent Misalignment in 20,574 Real-World Sessions. Tang et al. arXiv:2605.29442 (preprint; field telemetry). Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Underspecified/ambiguous instructions account for 15.36% of misalignment episodes (44.1% of intent-misreads trace to prompt gaps) — but the largest cause is instruction-following failure on clearly stated requirements (36.49%). Grounds: spec clarity is load-bearing AND insufficient — verification of compliance (review, checks) addresses the majority class clarity cannot.

[EBSE04] Evidence-Based Software Engineering. Kitchenham, Dybå, Jørgensen. ICSE 2004. Verified (July 2026, adversarial 3-vote source pass; identity + findings confirmed against the text). As of 2004 SE had no EBM-comparable research infrastructure and practice adoption ran on advocacy, with existing evidence almost entirely laboratory-tier. Grounds: the historical baseline — process practices are normally adopted without outcome evidence; a methodology that labels its unproven claims is the exception, not the laggard.

[AGILE-EVID] Empirical studies of agile software development: A systematic review. Dybå, Dingsøyr. Information and Software Technology 50(9–10):833–859, 2008, DOI 10.1016/j.infsof.2008.01.006 (opens in new tab). Verified (July 2026, adversarial 3-vote source pass). Of 1,996 agile studies to 2005, 36 (~1.8%) met the rigor bar; GRADE-graded strength of evidence for agile's benefits: "very low" — while adoption swept the industry. Grounds (with [EBSE04]): the field-normal evidence bar for process methodology is belief plus anecdote; outcome proof has never preceded adoption.

[BELIEFEVID] Belief & Evidence in Empirical Software Engineering. Devanbu, Zimmermann, Bird. ICSE 2016. Verified (July 2026, adversarial 3-vote source pass against the author PDF). 564 Microsoft developers: personal experience dominates technical opinion formation while research papers rank fifth of six; process beliefs diverge sharply between projects whose measured effects are both negligible; coding standards are believed in at 4.18/5 with a single scant published result. Grounds: practitioner conviction is not outcome evidence — for competitors' testimonials and for ours.

First-party guidance and preliminary evidence

These sources are not peer-reviewed. They may provide implementation guidance or preliminary evidence, never grounds for a MUST.

[ANTHROPIC-MULTIAGENT] How we built our multi-agent research system. Anthropic Engineering, 2025. Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). First-party orchestrator-worker account: states verbatim that "each subagent needs an objective, an output format, guidance on the tools and sources to use, and clear task boundaries," and that "without detailed task descriptions, agents duplicate work, leave gaps, or fail to find necessary information." Does not claim subagents are unaware of their orchestrated role (that observation is from other vendors' subagent guidance and is design rationale here). Tier: first-party engineering analysis, not peer-reviewed — never a MUST. Grounds (illustrative): delegated workers need an explicit brief and return contract; this supports Suspec's dispatch contract.

[QIAO-BROWNFIELD] Comprehension–Performance Gap in GenAI-Assisted Brownfield Programming: A Replication and Extension. Qiao et al. arXiv:2511.02922 (preprint), 4 Nov 2025. Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). In a within-subjects study of 18 graduate students, Copilot reduced task time and increased tests passed, but comprehension scores did not differ significantly between conditions. https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02922 (opens in new tab) Grounds: faster brownfield progress does not establish improved codebase understanding; the study does not establish that a particular governance artifact fixes the gap.

[CODERABBIT] State of AI vs Human Code Generation. CodeRabbit, February 2026. Verified (July 2026, direct report page). CodeRabbit analyzed 470 open-source pull requests (320 classified as AI-co-authored and 150 as human-only) and reported 10.83 issues per AI-co-authored PR versus 6.45 for human-only PRs, a 1.7× ratio. Authorship was inferred from observable signals, the human-only set may include undisclosed AI use, and CodeRabbit both produced the study and sells code review. https://www.coderabbit.ai/blog/state-of-ai-vs-human-code-generation-report (opens in new tab)vendor study; preliminary, not causal. Grounds: one vendor dataset reports different issue rates between its inferred authorship groups. CodeRabbit's shipped acceptance-criteria validation is recorded separately at [CODERABBIT-PRVAL].

[TERMBENCH] Terminal-Bench: Benchmarking Agents on Hard, Realistic Tasks in Command Line Interfaces. Merrill et al. arXiv:2601.11868 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). 89 curated hard terminal tasks with human solutions + verification tests; frontier models/agents score < 65%. Grounds: agent performance is a systems problem, not model-only — the harness/verification layer is where reliability is won (the verify/review rationale).

[HAL] Holistic Agent Leaderboard: The Missing Infrastructure for AI Agent Evaluation. Kapoor, Stroebl, … Narayanan (Princeton et al.). arXiv:2510.11977 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). A standardized evaluation harness cut evaluation time weeks→hours; 21,730 agent rollouts analyzed; LLM-aided inspection surfaced previously-unreported failure behaviours. Grounds: a standardized harness plus inspectable execution evidence materially improves agent evaluation.

[HARNESSBENCH] Harness-Bench: Measuring Harness Effects across Models in Realistic Agent Workflows. Yao et al. arXiv:2605.27922 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch + search). 106 sandboxed tasks, 5,194 trajectories; configuration-level harness choice produced a 23.8-point aggregate gap (best configurable harness 76.2 vs worst 52.4) on the same task set + model-backend pool. Grounds: the harness/system matters as much as the model — Suspec's leverage is explicit intent, verification, and independent review, not a model claim.

[AHE] Agentic Harness Engineering: Observability-Driven Automatic Evolution of Coding-Agent Harnesses. Lin et al. arXiv:2604.25850 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). Lifted Terminal-Bench 2 pass@1 69.7% → 77.0% over ten iterations; the gains came from tools, middleware, and long-term memory — not the system prompt. Grounds: harness mechanisms can affect outcomes beyond prompt wording; this does not isolate any Suspec mechanism.

[ORCHID] Assessing the Impact of Requirement Ambiguity on LLM-based Function-Level Code Generation (Orchid). Yang et al. arXiv:2604.21505 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). 1,304 function-level tasks across four ambiguity types: ambiguity consistently degrades generation (worst on the most advanced models); LLMs produce functionally divergent implementations from the same ambiguous requirement; and models cannot reliably identify or resolve ambiguity on their own. Grounds: supports explicit requirements and advisory ambiguity checks. It does not measure Suspec. Reinforces [SMELLS].

[METR] Measuring the Impact of Early-2025 AI on Experienced Open-Source Developer Productivity. Becker, Rush, Barnes, Rein (METR). arXiv:2507.09089 (preprint). Verified (June 2026, direct fetch). RCT, 16 experienced OSS devs, 246 tasks: allowing early-2025 AI increased completion time ~19%, even though devs expected a 24% speedup and believed afterward they were 20% faster (experts predicted 38–39% faster). Grounds: perceived ≠ measured — a self-reported "done"/"faster" is not evidence; independently checkable evidence is. (Scope: experienced devs on mature repos, n=16, early-2025 tools. Verified July 2026: METR's 2026 follow-up experiment was abandoned as unreliable — task self-selection bias compromised the data — and METR states developers are likely sped up by early-2026 tools, on weak evidence either way. Do not cite the 19% as a current-tools fact; the durable finding is the perception gap — believed +20% while measured −19% — i.e., self-reports are not outcome evidence.)

[SMARTBEAR] Code Review at Cisco Systems (in Best Kept Secrets of Peer Code Review). Cohen, Smart Bear Software, 2006. Verified (June 2026, web — the canonical case-study PDF). The largest lightweight-review case study of its time (2,500 reviews, 3.2M LOC, 50 developers, 10 months): defect-detection effectiveness is best on small changes — LOC under review under 200, not to exceed ~400 — and falls past ~60–90 minutes of review or at inspection rates above ~400–500 LOC/hour (the rate metric is distinct from the absolute size ceiling). https://static0.smartbear.co/support/media/resources/cc/book/code-review-cisco-case-study.pdf (opens in new tab)industry-dataset, not peer-reviewed; a single vendor-derived 2006 in-situ dataset — cite the 200–400 LOC band as a heuristic, never as law. Grounds: the size anchor for the oversized-packet heuristic (ADR-0094).

[CLAUDE-FILES] Explore the .claude directory. Anthropic, Claude Code documentation. Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Enumerates Claude Code's named configuration and managed application-data paths, including automatic cleanup; defines no generic artifact-discovery directory. https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-directory (opens in new tab) Grounds: ordinary Markdown does not gain a supported Claude capability from directory adjacency.

[CODEX-FILES] Codex configuration implementation. OpenAI, openai/codex. Verified (July 2026, direct source inspection). Defines Codex home, instructions, skills, session, history, memory, and state configuration separately; defines no generic artifact-discovery directory. https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs (opens in new tab) Grounds: ordinary Markdown does not gain a supported Codex capability from directory adjacency.

[CURSOR-FILES] @Files & Folders. Cursor documentation. Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Defines explicit file and folder context selection; arbitrary files enter context through selection, not a vendor artifact directory. https://docs.cursor.com/context/%40-symbols/%40-files-and-folders (opens in new tab) Grounds: portable Suspec artifacts need an explicit path, not Cursor-directory adjacency.

[AIDER-FILES] Specifying coding conventions. Aider documentation. Verified (July 2026, direct fetch). Defines /read <path> and --read <path> for explicit read-only file context; placement alone does not load a file. https://aider.chat/docs/usage/conventions.html (opens in new tab) Grounds: portable Suspec artifacts need an explicit path, not Aider-directory adjacency.

Rejected — DO NOT CITE (fabricated / misattributed / unconfirmed)

The skill-authoring literature attributes load-bearing figures to these arXiv ids. Direct fetch (June 2026) found each id resolves to an unrelated paper. They are recorded here so the fabrication is never re-introduced.

Rejected entries carry no <a id="..."> anchor. Do not cite them or add anchors to them.

Circulating claimCited asWhat the id actually isVerdict
"21× degradation when file-based state externalization is removed" (InfiAgent)arXiv:2511.10954Kapitza-Dirac interference of Higgs waves in superconductors (condensed-matter physics)REJECTED — misattributed; the 21× figure is unverifiable and MUST NOT be cited. File-state externalization is instead grounded on [CTXENG] + [CCTASKS] + [SCRATCHPAD].
"fixed turn limit at p75 cuts cost 24–68%" (More with Less)arXiv:2510.27502Reference Equations of State for Density Prediction in Regasified LNG Mixtures (chemical physics)REJECTED — misattributed.
"agentic failures are overwhelmingly context failures" (PAACE)arXiv:2511.21345Blind Turbo Demodulation for Differentially Encoded OFDM (signal processing)REJECTED — misattributed (the source that circulated it flagged it as unverified).

Also do-not-cite-as-fact (web-checked June 2026):

  • "17.1% performance drop / a 7B model beats a 70B model" under format restriction — traced only to a vendor blog with no primary source; unconfirmed. (The peer-reviewed version of this direction is [FORMATFREE].)
  • Piskala, "50% error reduction / 75% cycle-time" from spec-driven development (arXiv:2602.00180 (opens in new tab)) — position/survey, secondhand and uncontrolled; not a measured result.
  • Registered reports with no results yetSpec-Driven Code Generation (arXiv:2601.03878 (opens in new tab)) and Specification as a Quality Gate (arXiv:2603.25773 (opens in new tab)) report no measured outcomes (design/protocol/opinion only); cite as design rationale at most, never as evidence.
  • The "Tessl / Guillermo Rauch / specs-are-the-new-code" attributionmistaken (no evidence Rauch is associated with it); do not repeat it.

Discipline: a claim in docs/research/ cites a Verified entry, or carries an explicit "preliminary / non-peer-reviewed" caveat naming a Caveated entry, or it is not made. New sources are web-verified before they are added. This follows Suspec's evidence discipline (principles, Claims need sources).

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